A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Most of the routing protocols for MANETs are thus vulnerable to various types of attacks. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a very popular routing algorithm. However, it is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack, where a malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a destination node during the route discovery process. This attack becomes more sever when a group of malicious nodes cooperate each other. In this paper, a defense mechanism is presented against a coordinated attack by multiple black hole nodes in a MANET. The simulation carried out on the proposed scheme has produced results that demonstrate the effectiveness of the mechanism in detection of the attack while maintaining a reasonable level of throughput in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
A MANET is a collection of wireless hosts that can be rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio network without the aid of any established infrastructure or centralized administrator. Such networks can be used to enable next generation battlefield applications, including situation awareness systems for maneuvering war fighters, and remotely deployed unmanned micro-sensor networks. MANETs have some special characteristic features such as unreliable wireless media (links) used for communication between hosts, constantly changing network topologies and memberships, limited bandwidth, battery, lifetime, and computation power of nodes etc. While these characteristics are essential for the flexibility of MANETs, they introduce specific security concerns that are absent or less severe in wired networks. MANETs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, active interfering, impersonation, and denial-ofservice. Intrusion prevention measures such as strong authentication and redundant transmission can be used to improve the security of an ad hoc network. However, these techniques can address only a subset of the threats. Moreover, they are costly to implement. The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks requires that prevention techniques should be complemented by detection techniques, which monitor security status of the network and identify malicious behavior.
One of the most critical problems in MANETs is the security vulnerabilities of the routing protocols. A set of nodes in a MANET may be compromised in such a way that it may not be possible to detect their malicious behavior easily. Such nodes can generate new routing messages to advertise non-existent links, provide incorrect link state information, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus inflicting Byzantine failure in the network. One of the most widely used routing protocols in MANETs is the ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol [1] . It is a source initiated on-demand routing protocol. However, AODV is vulnerable to the wellknown black hole attack. In [2] , the authors have assumed that the black hole nodes in a MANET do not work as a group and have proposed a solution to identify a single black hole. However, their proposed method cannot be applied to identify a cooperative black hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes. In this paper, a mechanism is proposed to identify multiple black hole nodes cooperating as a group in an ad hoc network. The proposed technique works with slightly modified AODV protocol and makes use of the data routing information table (Section III) in addition to the cached and current routing table.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some related work in security mechanism in routing for MANETs. Section III gives an overview of AODV protocol and the cooperative black hole attack. Section IV describes the proposed security protocol and the associated algorithm. Section V presents the important results obtained in simulation. Section VI concludes the paper while highlighting some future scope of work.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of security and cooperation enforcement has received considerable attention by researchers in the ad hoc network community. In this section, some of these contributions are presented.
The problem of securing the routing layer using cryptographically secure messages is addressed by Hu et al. [3] , Papadimitratos and Haas [4] , and Sanzgiri et al. [5] . Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc networks assuming trusted certificate authorities have been proposed by Kong et al. [6] . Hubaux et al. [7] have employed a self-organized PGP-based scheme to authenticate nodes using chains of certificates and transitivity of trust. Stajano and Anderson [8] authenticate users by imprinting in analogy to ducklings acknowledging the first moving subject they see as their mother.
In contrast to securing the routing layer of ad hoc networks, some researchers have also focused on simply detecting and reporting misleading routing misbehavior. Watchdog and Pathrater [9] use observation-based techniques to detect misbehaving nodes, and report observed misbehavior back to the source of the traffic. Pathrater manages trust and route selection based on these reports. This allows nodes to choose better paths along which to route their traffic by routing around the misbehaving nodes. However, the scheme does not punish malicious nodes; instead, they are relieved of their packet forwarding burden.
CONFIDANT [10] detects misbehaving nodes by means of observation and more aggressively informs other nodes of this misbehavior through reports sent around the network. Each node in the network hosts a monitor for observations, reputation records for firsthand and trusted second-hand reports, trust records to control the trust assigned to the received warnings, and a path manager used by nodes to adapt their behavior according to reputation information. Subsequent research has found that reputation schemes can be beneficial for fast misbehavior detection, but only when one can deal with false accusations [11] .
Researchers have also investigated means of discouraging selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks, generally through payment schemes [12] . These approaches either require the use of tamperproof hardware or central bankers to do the accounting securely, both of which may not be appropriate in some truly ad hoc network scenarios. In the per-hop payment scheme proposed by Buttyan and Hubaux [14] , the payment units are called nuglets and reside in a secure tamper-proof module in each node. They have observed that given such a module, increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the entire network but also for individual nodes. The scheme can result in unfairness to some hosts, but its simplicity and performance may be appropriate in some cases.
Bansal and Baker [13] have proposed a scheme that relies on first-hand observations. Directly observed positive behavior increases the rating of a node, while directly observed negative behavior decreases it by an amount larger than that is used for positive increments. If the rating of a node dips below the faulty threshold, the node is added to a faulty list. The faulty list is appended to the route request by each node broadcasting it to be used as a list of nodes to be avoided. A route is rated good or bad depending on whether the next hop is on the faulty list. If the next hop of a route is in the faulty list, the route is rated as bad. As a response to misbehavior of a node, all traffic from that node is rejected. A second chance mechanism for redemption employs a timeout after an idle period. After a timeout, the node is removed from the faulty list with its rating remaining unchanged.
Sen et al. have presented a scheme for detection of malicious packet dropping nodes in a MANET [14] . The mechanism is based on local misbehavior detection and flooding of the detection information in a controlled manner in the network so that the malicious node is detected even if moves out a local neighborhood.
Deng, Li and Agarwal [2] have suggested a mechanism of defense against black hole attack in ad hoc networks. In their proposed scheme, as soon as the RouteReply packet is received from one of the intermediate nodes, another RouteRequest is sent from the source node to a neighbor node of the intermediate node in the path. This is to ensure that such a path exists from the intermediate node to the destination node. For example, let the source node S send RouteRequest packets and receive RouteReply through the intermediate malicious node M. The RouteReply packet of M contains information regarding its nexthop neighbor node. Let it contain information about the neighbor E. Then, the source node S sends FurtherRouteRequest packets to this neighbor node E. Node E responds by sending a FurtherRouteReply packet to source node S. Since node M is a malicious node, and thus not present in the routing list of node E, the FurtherRouteReply packet sent by node E will not contain a route to the malicious node M. But if it contains a route to the destination node D, then the new route to the destination through node E is selected, and the earlier selected route through node M is rejected. While this scheme completely eliminates the black hole attack by a single attacker, it fails completely in identifying a cooperative black hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes.
III. AODV AND ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS
In this section, a brief overview of the AODV routing protocol is presented and the security threat that are associated with this routing protocol are briefly discussed. More specifically, the cooperative black hole attack on AODV is also described.
A. AODV Overview
AODV is a reactive routing protocol that does not require maintenance of routes to destination nodes that are not in active communication. Instead, it allows mobile nodes to quickly obtain routes to new destination nodes. Every mobile node maintains a routing table that stores the next hop node information for a route to the destination node. When a source node wishes to route a packet to a destination node, it uses the specified route if a fresh enough route to the destination node is available in its routing table. If such a route is not available in its cache, the node initiates a route discovery process by broadcasting a RouteRequest (RREQ) message to its neighbors. On receiving a RREQ message, the intermediate nodes update their routing tables for a reverse route to the source node. All the receiving nodes that do not have a route to the destination node broadcast the RREQ packet to their neighbors. Intermediate nodes increment the hop count before forwarding the RREQ. A RouteReply (RREP) message is sent back to the source node when the RREQ query reaches either the destination node itself or any other intermediate node that has a current route to the destination. As the RREP propagates to the source node, the forward route to the destination is updated by the intermediate nodes receiving a RREP. The RREP message is a unicast message to the source node.
AODV uses sequence numbers to determine the freshness of routing information and to guarantee loop-free routes. In case of multiple routes, a node selects the route with the highest sequence number. If multiple routes have the same sequence number, then the node chooses the route with the shortest hop count. Timers are used to keep the route entries fresh.
When a link break occurs, RouteError (RERR) packets are propagated along the reverse path to the source invalidating all broken entries in the routing table of the intermediate nodes. AODV also uses periodic hello messages to maintain the connectivity of neighboring nodes.
AODV does not incorporate any specific security mechanism, such as strong authentication. Therefore, there is no straightforward mechanism to prevent mischievous behavior of a node such as MAC spoofing, IP spoofing, dropping packets, or altering the contents of the control packets. Protocols like SAR [15] have been developed to secure AODV against certain types of attacks. However, these protocols achieve limited security at the cost of performance degradation in terms of message overhead and latency time.
B. Cooperative Black Hole Attack
The blackhole attack has two phases. In the first phase, the malicious node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol such as AODV to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination node, with the intention of intercepting packets, even though the route is spurious. In the second phase, the attacker node drops the intercepted packets without forwarding them. There is a more subtle form of this attack when an attacker node suppresses or modifies packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the data packets from other nodes unaffected. This makes it difficult for other nodes to detect the malicious node. In this work, however, a defense mechanism has been proposed against a cooperative blackhole attack in a MANET that relies on AODV routing protocol. Symbolic notations in Fig. 1 are used in all the subsequent diagrams in the paper. In the standard AODV protocol, when the source node S (Fig. 2) wants to communicate with the destination node D, the source node S broadcasts the RouteRequest (RREQ) packet. Each neighboring active node updates its routing table with an entry for the source node S, and checks if it is the destination node or whether it has the current route to the destination node. If an intermediate node does not have the current route to the destination node, it updates the RREQ packet by increasing the hop count, and floods the network with the RREQ to the destination node D until it reaches node D or any other intermediate node that has the current route to D, as depicted in Fig.2 .
Fig.2. Network flooding by RREQ messages
The destination node D or any intermediate node that has the current route to D, initiates a RouteReply (RREP) in the reverse direction, as depicted in Fig. 3 . Node S starts sending data packets to the neighboring node that responded first, and discards the other responses. This works fine when the network has no malicious nodes.
Fig.3. Propagation of RREP messages
In [2] , authors have proposed a solution to identify and isolate a single blackhole node. However, the security threat arising out of the situation where multiple blackhole nodes act in coordination has not been addressed. For example, when multiple blackhole nodes are acting in coordination with each other, the first black hole node B 1 refers to one of its partners B 2 as the next hop, as depicted in Fig. 2 . In the mechanism propose in [2] , the source node S sends a FurtherRequest (FRq) to B 2 through a different route (S-2-4-B 2 ) other than via B 1 . Node S asks B 2 if it has a route to node B 1 and a route to destination node D. Because B 2 is cooperating with B 1 , its "FurtherReply (FRp)" will be "yes" to both the questions. According to the solution proposed in [2] , node S starts sending the data packets assuming that the route S-B 1 -B 2 is secure. However, in reality, the packets are intercepted and then dropped by node B 1 and the security of the network is compromised.
IV. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In this, section the proposed mechanism for defending against a cooperative black hole attack is presented. The mechanism modifies the AODV protocol by introducing two concepts, (i) data routing information (DRI) table and (ii) cross checking.
A. Data Routing Information
In the proposed scheme, two bits of additional information are sent by the nodes that respond to the Dashed Arrow: RREQ/RREP Packets
Node: Mobile Host
Node i has a route to node j and has routed data packets through node j Nodes i and j have route to each other and have routed data packets of each other A route exists between nodes i and j RREQ message of a source node during route discovery process. Each node maintains an additional data routing information (DRI) table. In the DRI table, the bit 1 stands for 'true' and the bit 0 stands for 'false'. The first bit 'From' stands for the information on routing data packet from the node (in the Node filed), while the second bit 'Through' stands for information on routing data packet through the node (in the Node field). With reference to the example depicted in Fig. 3 , a sample database maintained by node 4 is shown in Table 1 . The entry 1 0 for node 3 implies that node 4 has routed data packets from 3, but has not routed any data packets through 3 (before node 3 moved away from 4). The entry 1 1 for node 6 implies that, node 4 has successfully routed data packets from and through node 6. The entry 0 0 for node B 2 implies that, node 4 has not routed any data packets from or through B 2 . 
B. Cross Checking
The proposed scheme relies on reliable nodes (nodes through which source has routed data previously and knows them to be trustworthy) to transfer data packets. The modified AODV protocol and the algorithm for the proposed mechanism are depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. In the modified protocol, the source node (SN) broadcasts a RREQ message to discover a secure route to the destination node. Fig. 5 . Fig.4 . Modified AODV protocol to prevent cooperative balckhole attack As an example, let's consider the network in Fig. 6 . When node B 1 responds to source node S with RREP message, it provides its next hop node B 2 and DRI for the next hop (i.e. if B 1 has routed data packets through B 2 ). Here the blackhole node (B 1 ) lies about using the path by replying with the DRI value equal to 0 1. Upon receiving RREP message from B 1 , the source node S checks its own DRI table to see whether B 1 is a reliable node. Since S has never sent any data through B 1 before, B 1 is not a reliable node to S. Therefore, S sends FRq to B 2 via alternative path S-2-4-B 2 and asks B 2 about three things: (i) whether B 2 has routed any data from B 1 , (ii) who is B 2 's next hop, and (iii) whether B 2 has routed data packets through B 2 's next hop. Since B 2 is maliciously collaborating with B 1 , it replies positively to all the three queries and gives node 6 (chosen randomly) as its next hop. When the source node contacts node 6 via alternative path S-2-4-6 to cross check the validity of the claims of node B 2 , node 6 responds negatively. Since node 6 has neither a route to node B 2 nor it has received data packets from node B 2 , the DRI value corresponding to B 2 as stored in node 6 is 0 0 as shown in Fig. 6 . Based on this information, node S can infer that B 2 is a blackhole node. If node B 1 really had routed data packets through node B 2 before, it should have validated the node (B 2 ) before sending it. Now, since node B 2 is invalidated through node 6, the source node S infers that node B 1 is maliciously cooperating with node B 2 . Hence both nodes B 1 and B 2 are marked as blackhole nodes and this information is propagated throughout leading to the revocation of their certificates. Subsequently S discards any further responses from B 1 or B 2 and looks from a valid alternative route to D.
The process of cross checking the intermediate nodes is a one-time procedure which should be affordable for the purpose of security. The cost of crosschecking the nodes can be minimized by allowing the nodes to share the DRI table of their trusted nodes with each other. The experiments for the evaluation of the proposed scheme have been carried out using the network simulator ns-2. The 802.11 MAC layer implemented in ns-2 is used for simulation. An improved version of random waypoint model is used as the model of node mobility [16] . Performances of the three protocols are evaluated: (i) Standard AODV protocol, (ii) AODV with two malicious nodes cooperating in a blackhole attack, and (iii) AODV with the proposed algorithm. The scenarios developed to carry out the tests use two parameters: (i) the mobility of the nodes and (ii) the number of active connections in the network. The chosen parameters for simulation are presented in Table II . Following metrics are chosen to evaluate the impact of the blackhole attack on the simulated network: (i) packet delivery ratio and (ii) false routing packets sent by the attacker nodes. These metrics were used to measure the severity of the attack and the improvement that the scheme manages to achieve during an active attack scenario. Every point in the graph (Figs 7-10) is an average of the values obtained after the experiment is repeated five times. In Fig. 7 , the metric packet delivery ratio is plotted against the number of active connections. As the total number of mobile nodes in the network is 30, the maximum number of connections in the network is 29. A general observation from Fig. 7 is that AODV achieves maximum delivery ratio with 10 to 25 active connections. However the delivery ratio falls slightly when the maximum number of connections (in this case 29) is established. The cooperative blackhole attack has a very severe impact as it decreases the delivery ratio to a value that is even less than half of the normal AODV delivery ratio. With the proposed scheme, the delivery ratio obtained is around 60%, which is a significant improvement over the degraded performance of the network under cooperative blackhole attack without any security mechanism. Fig. 8 , packet delivery ratio is plotted against the mobility of the nodes. It is observed that AODV performs better for lower node mobility rates. The delivery rate starts dropping with increasing mobility of the nodes. The performance of the network significantly reduces when AODV is under the cooperative blackhole attack, and when the mobility of the nodes in the network increases. This behavior of the protocol is expected due to the following reason. With increasing mobility of the nodes the topology of the network changes faster, resulting in frequent route request generation. This gives an opportunity to a malicious node to send more false RREP packets. AODV under blackhole attack exhibits a decrease in delivery ratio to 38%. The proposed algorithm increases the delivery ratio to 55%, resulting in an average improvement of 17%.
The second metric that is used in the evaluation of the attack is the number of false packets sent by the attacker nodes versus the number of active connections in the network. This metric has been used to examine the overhead of the blackhole attack. From Fig. 9 , it is observed that the average number of false RREPs sent by the malicious nodes in all the experiments conducted was 2056, and the number of nodes that inserted the false route into their routing table was 22 out of the total 30 nodes. Fig. 10 shows that with the increase in the mobility, the number of false RREP packets sent by the malicious nodes also increases. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, routing security issues in MANETs are discussed in general, and in particular the cooperative blackhole attack has been described in detail. A security protocol has been proposed that can be utilized to identify multiple blackhole nodes in a MANET and thereby identify a secure routing path from a source node to a destination node avoiding the blackhole nodes. The proposed scheme has been evaluated by implementing it in the network simulator ns-2, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness of the mechanism. As a future scope of work, the proposed security mechanism may be extended so that it can defend against other attacks like resource consumption attack and packet dropping attack. Adapting the protocol for efficiently defending against grayhole attack-an attack where some nodes switch their states from blackhole to honest intermittently and vice versa, is also an interesting future work.
